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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Mr. Ray, on February 5, 1998, is 
considered the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah Code Sec. 78-2a-3(e). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on March 5, 1998, within 30 days of the entry of 
judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts of guilty. 
The Appellate Court must review all evidence and inferences in light most 
favorable of the verdict. Reversal is appropriate only when evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah provides, in relevant part, that: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel... to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him ... and the right to 
appeal in all cases ... The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself. 
Amendment Five of the Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
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No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law. 
Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of law. 
Utah Code Section 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part, that: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such 
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
Utah Code Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(i)(ii) and (iv) provides, in relevant part, that: 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any 
person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance or to 
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; and 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in 
conduct which results in any violation of any provision 
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c or 37d that is a 
felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or 
more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d on separate occasions that are undertaken on concert 
with five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or 
any other position of management. 
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Utah Code Section 76-5-301 provides, in relevant part, that: 
A person commits kidnapping when he intentionally or 
knowingly and without authority of law and against the will 
of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or 
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing 
him to risk of serious bodily injury; or 
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parents 
or guardian. 
Utah Code Section 76-5-103 provides, in relevant part, that: 
A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault 
as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Mr. Ray appeals from his conviction following a Jury Trial of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute in violation of Utah Code Sec. 
58-37-8-(2)(a), Kidnapping in violation of Utah Code Sec. 76-5-301 and Aggravated 
Assault in violation of Utah Code Sec. 76-5-103. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
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1. On October 30, 1997, Mr. Ray was charged in a two-count Information 
under Case No. 9717-263 with Kidnapping, a second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 
76-5-301 and Aggravated Assault, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-5-103. 
Norma Jean Strong was the alleged victim and both charges arose from incidents 
occurring on October 29, 1997. 
2. In an Information under Case No. 9717-271 dated October 30, 1997, but 
filed November 24, 1997, Mr. Ray was charged with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 
58-37-8-(l)(i)(ii) and (iv). The acts allegedly occurred on October 29, 1997, the same 
date as the previous charges. Norma Jean Strong was the witness on these charges. 
3. On November 26, 1997, a Preliminary Hearing was held on Case No. 
9717-263. Immediately afterwards, a Preliminary Hearing was held on Case No. 
9717-271. Mr. Ray was bound over on both cases and the matters were set for a 
consolidated jury trial on December 15, 1997. 
4. After trial the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. 
C. DISPOSITION TN THE COURT BELOW. 
Sentencing was on February 5, 1998. At that time the trial court ordered Mr. Ray 
to be committed to the Utah State Prison for one to fifteen years on Count I and a term 
not to exceed five years on Count II of Case No. 9717-263 and to serve a term of one to 
fifteen years in Case No. 9717-271. The Court ordered the sentences to be served 
consecutively. A Findings, Judgment and Commitment was filed that same day. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 5,1998. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
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The complaining witness, Norma Jean Strong, testified that Mr. Ray was her 
boyfriend for approximately two years (R-283). During that period they were involved in 
illegal drug activities together (R-283). Ms. Strong guessed that she had a drug problem 
and at least acknowledged having had one and being in counseling to get her "life 
straightened out" (R-284). She did drugs with Mr. Ray on a regular basis (R-302). On 
October 29, 1997, she was with Mr. Ray voluntarily and was requested by him to rent a 
motel room, something they did frequently during their relationship (R-284). 
Ms. Strong testified that she and Mr. Ray were fighting that day and that he was 
screaming at her. She was terribly afraid (R-285). She stated he had made threats to her 
because she had filed a peace bond (R-285). 
Ms. Strong's children had been removed from her and placed in a foster home for 
failure to protect. The failure to protect them was from Mr. Ray (R-286). 
Mr. Ray owned at least two guns. Although Ms. Strong saw one on October 29, 
Mr. Ray did not point it at her (R-289, R-290). Despite testimony of being afraid of 
Mr. Ray over a lengthy period of time, Ms. Strong was able to leave his presence, make 
a phone call to the Grand County Sheriffs Office, and return to Mr. Ray (R-291). 
Ms. Strong informed Mr. Ray that she had called the police (R-292). 
Ms. Strong allowed Mr. Ray into her vehicle for a return trip to Moab. Ms. Strong 
subsequently dropped Mr. Ray off at the side of the road, returned to the motel for 
personal property, then came back and picked up Mr. Ray again (R-293). Ms. Strong 
testified she was hit and her hair was pulled on the drive to Moab (R-294). Ms. Strong 
pulled over, took the keys out of the car and her purse and said she wouldn't ride with Mr. 
Ray any longer (R-295). 
Mr. Ray wanted her to come back to the car. After some hitting and hair pulling 
during which Ms. Strong said she felt excruciating pain (R-296), Ms. Strong told Mr. Ray 
he could have her car and gave him the keys. Mr. Ray took the keys, went to the car, 
started it, did a U-turn, and drove the vehicle in Ms. Strong's direction at a high rate of 
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speed, stopping inches from her. Ms. Strong told Mr. Ray to take the car and go. He 
refused. Mr. Ray put his arm around her neck and head, dragging and choking her. She 
testified she blacked out (R-297). 
Mr. Ray dragged the witness to her car, opened the back seat and put her in it 
(R-298). Mr. Ray bit Ms. Strong on the nose and hit her over the head with something 
causing knots all over it (R-298). 
Ms. Strong was placed in the back seat of the car and Mr. Ray commenced the 
drive back to Moab. During the trip he threatened to kill her many times (R-300). 
Mr. Ray went to the homes of some friends. At the home of the second friend, 
Ms. Strong's car keys were returned to her and she drove herself away. Approximately 
two hours elapsed from the time the parties were at Blue Hill until Ms. Strong drove away 
(R-301,R-302). 
Mr. Ray had a habit of keeping drugs in bags and hiding them outside—never 
bringing them indoors (R-304). The last time the witness saw Mr. Ray with drugs was 
two or three days before in a purple Crown Royal bag that appeared to have about eight 
ounces in it (R-306). Ms. Strong did not see any drugs on the 29th (R-306). 
On Cross Examination, Ms. Strong testified as to her fragile emotional state, her 
extensive drug use, her children being removed from her (R-31 l-R-313). She admitted to 
using drugs one or two days before the 29th. 
Ms. Strong testified the only reason she got a peace bond against Mr. Ray was 
because Social Services told her she had to do so. Additionally the same agency required 
ix to break off her relationship with Mr. Ray (R-316). The peace bond was obtained 
perhaps as long as a month before October 29 (R-315). 
Ms. Strong had the opportunity to have gotten away from Mr. Ray on several 
occasions and in fact had told him on the 29th she was leaving the motel room to call the 
police (R-318). 
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Ms. Strong testified that despite having seen a gun in Mr. Ray's possession, and 
despite his threats to kill her a number of times, she stopped for him when she saw him at 
the side of the road (R-326). She stated he "took" the car keys (R-327). 
She testified she could have gotten away "sometimes" over the previous two or 
three days but didn't (R-329). 
She did not see the marble bag or the other stuff in Monticello on October 29 
(R-329). 
She didn't see any evidence of drugs, do any drugs, see Mr. Ray do any drugs, or 
see Mr. Ray take any drugs out of the vehicle and hide them on October 29 (R-330). 
Ms. Strong's relationship with Mr. Ray was deteriorating and she knew the police were 
looking for him on the 29th. (R-330, R-331). Mr. Ray had a sexual relationship with a 
woman named Becky that Ms. Strong knew about (R-333). 
The witness identified four pictures (Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4) of herself showing 
physical injuries. Not all of the injuries were incurred on October 29 (R-343-R-345). 
Mary Ann Sheldon testified she was on Blue Hill on October 29, 1997, and she 
observed a man leap from a vehicle, tackle a person, got a license plate number and 
description of the man. She provided that information to the police (R-348-R-352). 
Eddie Guerrero, a Moab City Police Officer, testified that he was the police officer 
who stopped Ms. Strong upon her entry into Moab based on reports from his dispatch 
(R-354-R-356). Ms. Strong described an assault on her by Rodney Ray (R-358). She told 
the officer she and Mr. Ray had drugs in Monticello (R-359). 
Cindy Montague of the Moab City Police Department testified she saw Ms. Strong 
on October 29, took the pictures marked Exhibits 1-4 and that they reflect how 
Ms. Strong looked on that date (R-366, R-367). 
Susan Nebeker testified. She is a nurse practitioner at Allen Memorial Hospital in 
Moab, Utah. She treated Ms. Strong on October 29. Ms. Strong told her she had been 
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threatened with knives. Ms. Nebeker observed several bruises and abrasions of varying 
age (R-369-R-372). 
Steve Caldwell testified that he knew both Rodney Ray and Norma Jean Strong 
and that he had seen them on October 29. Ms. Strong was in the back seat of the car in a 
fetal position. She stated twice, "Don't hurt me. "Don't hit me anymore" (R-375, R-376). 
Ms. Strong had stolen a pistol from his home a week before the 29th (R-377). 
Mr. Ray opined to Mr. Caldwell that Ms. Strong would come out of her incoherent 
state in about fifteen minutes. He was right. Mr. Caldwell compared Ms. Strong to a little 
kid throwing a tantrum who quits when there's no one around to watch (R-382, R-383). 
He stated that he believed she was putting on an act and had seen her do lots of weird 
things before (R-383-R-385).. He testified he has seen her hit herself before, including in 
the fairly recent past (R-386). The self-hitting was so intense he felt it necessary to 
restrain her (R-387). He testified that Ms. Strong knew she had to stay away from 
Mr. Ray to get her children back, but every time he saw her she contacted Mr. Ray 
(R-387). 
Joe Nelson, Mr. Caldwell's neighbor, testified he heard a female scream on 
October 29 (R-389). He knew Ms. Strong and saw her at Mr. Caldwell's property. He did 
not observe the injuries at that time that are displayed in Exhibit 2 (R-395). 
Deputy Kelly Bradford of the San Juan County Sheriffs Office testified that he 
went to the Super 8 Motel in Monticello, Utah, where Mr. Ray and Ms. Strong had been. 
He was there on October 29. Beyond a cement berm outside the motel he found a small 
bag which was marked Exhibit 5 (R-397-R-399). It contained a substance he believed to 
be methamphetamine. The substance in the Oakley bag was identified as 113.2 grams of 
methamphetamine by stipulated entry of the State Crime Lab report, Exhibit 6 (R-414). 
Kent Adair, the Monticello Police Chief, testified that on October 29, 1997, he was 
present when the bag found by Officer Bradford was opened. There were six baggies 
inside (R-411). 
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He testified the motel parking lot was accessible to anyone entering off the street. 
The person who left the bag there wouldn't necessarily have to have been checked into 
the motel (R-419). Ms. Strong registered at the motel under a false name (R-420). He 
testified people do not leave methamphetamine some place where they wouldn't be close 
toit(R-421). 
After the State rested, the defense called John Roberts. Mr. Roberts was married to 
Ms. Strong from March 1984 until 1994. He filed for divorce in 1992, but dropped that 
case. He testified she made false allegations in the divorce. Her reputation for credibility 
in the community is bad (R-430-R-432). Mr. Roberts also knew Norma Jean had injured 
herself in the past. She also had made false allegations that he caused injuries to her that 
he had not. The false allegations included tackling and pinning her down (R-434, R-435). 
Mr. Roberts was aware of Ms. Strong having made false stories about being 
abducted or chased, including one in which the Grand County Attorney supposedly killed 
two people (R-336, R-337). 
E. MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE. 
The above Statement of Facts accurately reflects the record in this matter. All 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict can be summarized as follows: 
1. Norma Jean Strong, the Defendant's girlfriend for two years before the 
dates in the Information, did illegal drugs with him on a regular basis. 
2. Mr. Ray had a habit of hiding his drugs outside of the hotels where he 
frequently stayed with Ms. Strong. 
3. Methamphetamine was found outside the motel where the Defendant and 
Ms. Strong checked in. 
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4. Ms. Strong testified to an extended period of intimidation and beating over 
a lengthy period of time, not just on October 29. Ms. Strong testified about being choked 
by the Defendant, hit with a gun, and having had her vehicle driven at her at a high rate 
of speed. 
5. Ms. Strong testified she was forced into her own vehicle by Mr. Ray at Blue 
Hill and was held against her will for approximately two hours. An independent witness 
testified as to seeing a man leap from a vehicle and tackle a person. 
6. Witnesses testified they observed Ms. Strong in a fetal position and 
screaming. 
7. Police and medical personnel testified they observed injuries on Ms. Strong 
consistent with those she testified about. 
Defendant will argue below why the above is legally insufficient to support the 
jury's verdict. However, the following points must be noted. 
1. Ms. Strong was a habitual, extensive drug user, was in counseling and had a 
fragile emotional state. 
2. Ms. Strong's children had been removed from her by a State agency. Their 
return was conditioned upon her termination of her relationship with Mr. Ray. 
3. Despite the above, and despite testimony of her great fear of Mr. Ray, 
Ms. Strong continued to see Mr. Ray and testified the only reason she obtained a peace 
bond was because Social Services made her. 
4. Ms. Strong had numerous opportunities to leave Mr. Ray's presence and in 
fact had done so to phone the police (informing him she was doing so), and returning to 
the motel after she picked him up at the side of the road. She did not take advantage of 
other opportunities to get away, 
5. She did not see the marble bag or any other drugs in Monticello on the29th 
of October. 
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6. The area where the methamphetamine was found was not under the 
exclusive control of Defendant. It could have been left there by a person who didn't stay 
at the motel. 
7. Ms. Strong and Mr. Ray's relationship had deteriorated to the point where 
he was having a sexual relationship with another woman. 
8. Steve Caldwell, one of the "fetal position/screaming" witnesses, stated he 
felt Ms. Strong was putting on an act like a little kid throwing a tantrum. He had 
witnessed Ms. Strong do weird things and hit herself before to the point he felt it 
necessary to restrain her. 
9. Ms. Strong is a thief. 
10. Joe Nelson, the other "fetal position/screaming" witness, did not observe 
injuries on Ms. Strong consistent with the Exhibits. Ms. Strong was alone for some time 
before being contacted by Officer Guerrero. 
11. John Roberts, Ms. Strong's ex-husband testified as to her bad reputation for 
credibility, that she made false allegations including some similar to her complaints in 
this case, and that she had injured herself in the past. 
12. Ms. Strong lied when she registered at the motel. 
13. Mr. Ray was not close to the methamphetamine. People do not leave 
methamphetamine where they will not be close to it. 
14. There was no testimony that either the amount of methamphetamine or its 
packaging indicated an intent to distribute or was for anything more than personal 
consumption. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Even considering that all of the marshalled evidence is true, the testimony of 
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Ms. Strong is so biased and unbelievable that no reasonable inferences can be drawn 
therefrom. There is no evidence whatsoever to support a conclusion of Possession with 
Intent to Distribute. 
There must be a reasonable doubt as to all three counts. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: The evidence at trial was insufficient to find Mr. Ray guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt on any of the three counts. 
Mr. Ray concedes that the burden is on him when challenging the sufficiency of 
the verdict to marshall all of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion, and 
show how, after making all reasonable inferences therefrom, the same is legally 
insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion. State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314, 317 
(Utah App. 1992), citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). See also 
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225. His position is two-fold. 
First, the testimony of Ms. Strong is so inherently untrustworthy that no one can 
find Mr. Ray guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on kidnapping or aggravated assault based 
on it. Second, the same arguments apply to his possession at all of methamphetamine, but 
certainly there is no evidence whatsoever to convict him of intent to distribute. 
There is no question that methamphetamine was found in the parking lot of a motel 
where Mr. Ray had been briefly and recently. Nor is there a dispute that Ms. Strong 
suffered some injury, however the biases and motives of Ms. Strong, together with her 
inherent unreliability, pervade the trial record and pervert justice. 
Ms. Strong's biases are clear. She was at the end of a two-year relationship with 
Defendant. He had already begun a sexual relationship with another. She was certainly 
angry enough with the Defendant to want revenge against him. 
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Her motives are equally transparent. She needed to take decisive action to impress 
Social Services. In order to get her children back she had to remove Defendant from her 
life. It is clear that despite such incentive she was unable to do so. It was convenient to 
have the jury do the same. 
She exhibited a willingness to manipulate Social Services in telling them she was 
doing what they wanted in getting a restraining order, yet continued to see Mr. Ray 
behind their backs. It is certainly easy to assume an equal willingness to manipulate Mr. 
Ray's jury. 
Her credibility is less than tenuous. She was a habitual, extensive user of 
debilitating, illicit drugs. Perhaps because of that, perhaps for other reasons, she was in a 
fragile state and testified frequently that she was frequently near collapse. She lied at the 
motel when registering. Her bad reputation for credibility in the community was not 
rebutted. 
Each of the offenses needs to be considered individually, although the credibility 
issues discussed should be considered in the whole. 
First, Kidnapping. Clearly the parties' relationship should be viewed charitably as 
dysfunctional. They engaged in repeated patterns or games of pursuer and pursued. Just 
as clearly, Ms. Strong was a participant, not a victim, of this role playing. Her testimony 
was clear that she had numerous opportunities over several days to leave Mr. Ray and his 
presence. Despite her protestations of fear, she was sufficiently comfortable with Mr. Ray 
to tell him she was going to call the police, leave him, and return. Scarcely behavior that 
indicates coercion. Her testimony about the events that occurred at Blue Hill have to be 
considered not just in the light of her credibility, but also in the context of the totality of 
the relationship. 
Second, Aggravated Assault. The one disinterested witness at Blue Hill did not 
corroborate Ms. Strong's story about an assault with the vehicle. Her injuries that were 
witnessed by others could be the result not of the various abuses she testified she suffered 
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from Mr.. Ray, but be self-inflicted. Considering a witness who saw her about the time of 
her last contact with Defendant did not observe the injuries consistent with the Exhibits, 
and considering her penchant for self-inflicted wounds and false reports, this is likely. Its 
probability is bolstered by the testimony of the other witness who saw her around the time 
of her last contact with Defendant. He thought she was faking. 
Third, Possession with Intent to Distribute. Even given the laxness of constructive 
possession standards, it is hard to find any nexus between the Defendant and the 
methamphetamine found at the motel. Ms. Strong didn't see any drugs on the day in 
question. She had an opportunity and motive to go back and plant the drugs if she did 
have some. The drugs were found in an area that Defendant had no exclusive control 
over. People don't stray far from their drugs. 
As noted above, even if this Court gets past the problems of possession, the record 
is totally void of any indication of intent to distribute. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard for reversal for insufficient evidence is "only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime of which he 
[or she] was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), cited in State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). Bracketed material in original. The Defendant 
respectfully suggests his case meets exactly those standards and respectfully requests that 
his conviction be reversed. 
DATED this j^tA day of December, 1998. 
WILLIAM L. SCH^JJTZ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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